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Abstract:
This paper provides an interpretation of development as a process of accumulation of technological and social capabilities, dependent upon taking advantage of different and successive windows of opportunity. The nature of such windows would be determined by evolving technologies in the leading countries of the world system. The interplay of continuity and discontinuity that characterizes technical change would open successive spaces of possibility, some narrower some wider, some only sufficient for initiating development processes others allowing significant leaps forward. The shifts in the direction of technical change associated with each technological revolution would provide the best opportunities for catching-up.
At each stage, it would be vital to identify the changes in industrial power structures and in the interests of firms in the advanced world in order to negotiate complementary strategies and establish positive-sum games. Success would result from recognizing, consciously or intuitively, the nature of each successive opportunity in order to capture whatever learning possibilities it offers and be better placed each time. Setbacks would happen when holding on old practices after the conditions that had made them effective have ceased to exist.
On the basis of this interpretation, the author reviews the complementarity between the successive models of development implemented since the 1950s and the stage of deployment of the main technologies in the advanced world. In the same line of analysis, she looks ahead to the next period and its possibilities.
A key concept is that of "techno-economic paradigm" defined as the set of all-pervasive technologies and generic organizational principles that shape and condition the opportunities of each period. Since each technological revolution leads to a change of paradigm, it is vital to understand its main characteristics, for they can be applied to rejuvenate most mature technologies and used as criteria for designing appropriate institutions and effective policies.
Following the logic of the flexible networks paradigm of the "Information Age," the author emphasizes the need to strengthen human capital and increase capacity for innovation. She also holds that the States or markets dichotomy is inadequate for facing the present challenges.
In particular, the "strong State" would have to be reinvented applying the decentralized model of organization of the modern global corporation, with the local States taking a proactive role in wealth creation across the territory and the national State acting as strategic leader, consensus builder and "broker" between the supranational and subnational levels.
Introduction: Technical change and development
Technology has usually been treated as a specialized area in development policies, dealt with by separate institutions. Yet, as we hope to show, technology is much more than an ingredient in development strategies; it is a conditioning element of their viability.
Development opportunities are a moving target. Any serious observer of the development achievements, from the late 1950s to the late 1970s, will have to recognize that the import substitution strategies applied by country after country led to gradual and significant advances. There was in fact increasing hope for continued success in the mid-1970s, when the combination of "industrial redeployment" and export promotion was showing and promising further and deeper advances. The subsequent failure, deterioration and decline of most countries that tried to continue along the protected, subsidized model has swung the pendulum towards a complete denial of the achievements of such a model and opened the way for upholding free markets as the only way to reach development, though proof of this is yet to be had.
What we are going to argue here is that windows of opportunity for development appear and change as successive technological revolutions are deployed in the advanced countries.
Transfer of technology and of production facilities is only willingly undertaken with mutual benefits in sight. The reason why import substitution strategies were successful, at the time, was that they constructed a positive-sum game with maturing industries in the developed world, where company after company confronted technological constriction and market saturation. The advent of the information revolution radically changed such conditions, creating a different stage and different viable options.
This interpretation examines development strategies from a different angle, which we believe particularly fruitful for the challenges of globalization and the "Information Age."
We will first review how technologies evolve in order to understand the conditions that generate development opportunities and to identify their nature. We then approach the question of development as one of learning to benefit from such changing opportunities. This is illustrated with an overview of the successive development models of the last fifty years and a look at the challenges posed by the next stage of concentration of power in the global economy. Finally, some of the institutional requirements for coping with the new "flexible networks paradigm" are examined.
Product cycles, development and changing barriers to entry
The role of imported technologies as stepping-stones on the way to industrialization is a historically well recognized fact, on the basis of the experience of the United States and of successive European countries in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. More recently, this fact has been brought to the fore again by the rapid emergence of Japan as a front rank country and the surge towards development of the four Dragons in Asia. Their success has been clearly associated with the absorption of technology from the more advanced countries and with their own efforts to adopt, adapt, modify and gradually master the technical know-how involved. 1 Yet, in that same recent period, many more countries met with disappointment while making apparently similar attempts to use imported technology for development. In fact, many countries and whole regions, such as Africa and most of South America, seem to have lost much of the ground gained.
2
The causes of these different results lie partly in the particular policies applied as well as in the specific conditions of the countries in question. Even more profoundly, they are rooted in the nature of the windows of opportunity created by technological evolution in the core countries and in the capacity to take advantage of them whether consciously or intuitively.
We need therefore to make the connection with the abundant literature on how technologies evolve and diffuse. Mytelka (1989 ) Katz (1996 3 Hirsch (1965) 4 Wells (1972) 1.
This outward migration from the country of origin to other advanced countries and from there to the less advanced, revealed one of the processes behind Leontieff's surprising finding about U.S. exports having a higher labor content than its imports. 5 This paradoxical situation of the technological leader at the time, was thus associated with the changing characteristics of evolving technologies. In the early phases, technologies are likely to be more labor-intensive or higher users of relatively costly knowledge-intensive labor 6 than when they approach maturity, with highly mechanized and automated processes.
5 Leontief (1953) 6 Hirsch (1965 and 1967 ) Vernon (1966 and recently Von Tunzelmann and Anderson (1999) A schematic presentation of the U.S. trade position in the product life-cycle
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Figure 2A
Source: Based on Soete (1988) Hirsch S (1967) they have minimal potential for profit making; they face stagnating markets and have almost no space left for productivity improvements. So, in general, entering at maturity is expensive, not very profitable and not very promising, which is why protection is usually needed. Nevertheless, it is probably the best starting point for creating a basic industrialization platform, generating learning capabilities and setting up the main infrastructure and other externalities needed to support development.
However, catching-up supposes a dynamic development process, fuelled by local innovation and growing markets. This requires as early an entry as feasible. Surprisingly enough, apart from the mature phase of technologies, the other moment when weaker players confront surmountable barriers is not in phases two or three but rather in phase one. This happens to be the most promising entry point, since, as indicated in figure 2B , potential profits are high, there is ample space for market and productivity growth and 7 Based on Perez and Soete (1988) 8 Phase 4 can be roughly understood to encompass Wells' IV and V in figure one.
Changing potential of technologies as they evolve to maturity
Space for productivity improvement 
Figure 2B
Source: Based on Gerschenkron A (1962). Cundiff (1973) Kotler (1980 ) Dosi (1982 investment costs are relatively low. Even R&D investment, can often be lower than that of the original innovator.
One would think however that only firms in advanced countries would possess the high degree of knowledge required in this phase, as shown in figure 2A . 
Technologies, systems, revolutions and paradigms
The evolution of technologies is a complex process: Technologies are interconnected in systems, which are interwoven and interdependent, both among themselves and with the physical, social and institutional environment.
A great deal of learning is gradual and incremental. However there is no inevitable progression towards an ever more advanced -and ever more unattainable-frontier; there are important discontinuities that become breaches for latecomers to leap forward. These are technological revolutions, which are major shifts in the direction of technical change, providing the means for modernizing most activities at the price of abandoning many of the previously accumulated managerial skills and part of the previous equipment with its associated expertise. The revolutionary new technologies provide entirely new opportunities for learning and catching up.
It is the interplay of continuous and discontinuous changes, which explains why and how windows of opportunity for development change over time.
a. Technological trajectories and accumulated experience
Despite their individual specific variations, many technologies tend to follow a similar sequence in the rate and direction of change and improvement from initial innovation to maturity, which very roughly coincides with the evolution of their markets from introduction to saturation. 9 Figure 3A represents the typical trajectory of a technology.
9 Abernathy and Utterback (1975) . Dosi (1982 ) Sahal (1985 .For Management text books, see Cundiff (1973) and Kotler (1980) . For a comprehensive overview see Coombs et al. (1987) and Dosi (1988) . For a complete interpretation of the relationship between technology, economics and policy, see Freeman's (1974) classic on the economics of innovation or the updated version Freeman and Soete(1997) . 
Diminishing returns to innovation
Source: Based on Dosi (1982 ) Wolf (1912 After a radical innovation gives birth to a new product, capable of creating a new industry, there is an initial period of further innovation and optimization, leading to the acceptance of the product in the appropriate market segment. Soon the interaction with the market determines the direction of improvements, often defining a dominant design, 10 and from then on, as markets grow, there are successive incremental innovations to improve the quality of the product, the productivity of the process and the market position of the producers. Eventually, maturity is reached when further investment in innovation brings diminishing returns. Depending on the significance of the product, the whole process can take a few years or several decades. In this latter case, "improvements" usually involve successive models.
After the early innovations, those who are developing the technology acquire advantage, not only through patents, but also and perhaps more importantly through accumulated experience with product, process and markets. This encloses the relevant knowledge and know-how within the firms and its suppliers, making it less and less accessible to entrants.
Furthermore, this experience gradually increases the speed with which innovations can be adopted so that the later ones are very rapidly incorporated, making it difficult for lagging followers. The evolution of technology systems follows a trajectory essentially similar to that of single products ( Figure 3A ). The series of new products would be the "incremental improvements" to the system. In the first two phases, there are many truly major products with a long life cycle, afterwards their numbers and importance tends to diminish until the last ones are minor and short-lived (as in figure 3B ). Figure 4 gives the stylized example of the system of home electrical appliances, which begins with refrigerators, washing machines and vacuum cleaners, grows with a series of new products and the successive models of the early ones, which all tend to reach maturity together with the introduction of the last minor innovations such as electric can-openers and carving knives. The figure also indicates how systems become rooted in particular territories through the growing network of parts and service suppliers and the gradual construction of the regulatory framework and other institutional facilitators.
11 Freeman et al. (1982) Co-evolution of a technology system and its environment:
Home electrical appliances This growing interplay of "hard and soft" elements is part of what Abramovitz 12 meant when criticizing the notion of development as simply the accumulation of capital and labor and emphasizing the need for accumulating social capability. It is also related to the notion of national or regional "systems of innovation," formed by the interacting agents.
13
The need to form these complex webs of mutually supporting activities and institutions explains some of the limitations involved in development based on the transfer of already mature technologies. It also strengthens the case of those who recommend building upon the existing traditions, local capabilities and knowledge of each specific territory. 14 It 12 Abramovitz (1986) 13 Freeman (1987 ) Lundvall (1988 14 Porter (1990) finally shows the type of effort required for supporting the survival of pioneering firms in developing countries.
Technological revolutions and the interconnection of systems 15
Each technological revolution is a cluster of technology systems, which gradually create conditions for the appearance of further systems, all following similar principles and benefiting from the same externalities. Figures Again, figures 3A and 3B, stretching the "time" dimension, can be roughly seen as representing the life trajectory of a technological revolution, where the "improvements" are the successive new technology systems. There are many major systems appearing in the early growth period; fewer and less significant ones as maturity is approached. Figure 5B
Techno-economic paradigms and the rejuvenation of all activities
The existing mature industries, however, do not just stagnate or passively cohabit with the new. Each technological revolution provides generically pervasive technologies and new organizational practices for a significant increase in the potential productivity of most existing activities. The principles behind this process are gradually articulated into an ideal best practice model, which we have proposed to call a "technological style"
16 or a "technoeconomic paradigm." 17 The result is a gradual rejuvenation of the whole productive structure, so that modernized mature industries can again behave like "new" ones.
This is one reason why the hopes held in the North-South Dialogue of the late 1970s for the permanent transfer of the "old" industries to the developing world were disappointed. Since the 1980s, one industry after another has been modernized. Even the very traditional clothing industry has been upgraded, segmented and put on an innovative path.
18
A paradigm shift as a change in managerial "common sense"
A techno-economic paradigm articulates the technical and organizational model for taking best advantage of the potential of the technological revolution. It provides a new set of "common sense" principles guiding the decision-making processes of entrepreneurs, innovators, managers, engineers and investors towards maximum efficiency and effectiveness in new and old activities. For those who had been successful with the previous one, the adoption of a new paradigm can be devastating. Apart from requiring the 16 Perez (1983) 17 Perez (1985) . The term is meant to serve as an umbrella concept connecting to the notion of "technological paradigms" proposed by Dosi (1982) to refer to the trajectories of individual technologies. 18 Hoffman and Rush (1988) Mytelka (1991) abandonment of hard-earned experience, it feels like turning the world upside down.
19
Figure 6 illustrates how the shift from the mass production paradigm to the flexible networks model transforms management criteria in all activities, from product choice and design, through organizational structures, to forms of operation and personnel relations 19 Peters (1989) Coriat (1991) 
Development as learning to take advantage of changing opportunities
The picture we have been trying to paint, with the widest of brush strokes, is one of technological evolution as characterized by continuities and discontinuities rooted in the nature of competition in the capitalist system. On a micro level, each radical innovation represents a discontinuity followed by continued evolution, until the constriction of the space for increasing productivity and profits gives rise to other radical innovations. On the macro level, technological revolutions irrupt in the economic system, bringing whole constellations of new products, technologies and industries. These major discontinuities induce great surges of growth, which swell initially in the core countries, gradually encompass and rejuvenate most of the previously existing industries, and finally spread out towards the periphery, while another great surge takes shape and irrupts in the core.
Developing countries are thus running after a moving target. It not only moves constantly ahead but it also shifts direction about every half century. Ruling out autarchy as an option, development would be about learning to play this moving and shifting game, which is also a power game.
Would this be another version of dependency theory? It certainly involves a notion of
North-South, center-periphery complementarity. Nevertheless, it gives a relatively positive answer to the possibility of breaking the vicious circle of underdevelopment under appropriate policies. Followers that understand the game and play it well might find a route for leaping forward and catching up. In this context, it is important to recognize that the really useful lessons of the example of the Asian Tigers are not to be found in a recipe to imitate, but rather in an understanding of the world dynamics that made it possible. For such an understanding, we need to know why the most favorable conditions would occur during the periods of paradigm shift.
b. Paradigm transitions as double technological opportunities
For about twenty years or more, during the transition, there is a coexistence of old and new technologies. The bulk of already mature technologies of the previous paradigm is stretching, suffering from constriction of productivity and markets and geographically outspreading to survive, while the new ones are exploding, flourishing and growing at high rates with huge profit margins. Such were the trends that characterized the times of stagflation during the 1970s and 80s in the advanced world. These phenomena lead to centrifugal trends, where the rich, modern and successful get richer and the poor and weak get poorer. Yet, paradoxically, it is at this period with the worst social and economic conditions that the best opportunities appear.
This period of paradigm transition provides the simultaneous opening of the two widest windows of opportunity: phase one of the new technologies and phase four of the old (Figure 7 ). We had argued earlier that although mature products can serve to achieve growth for a while, they are not capable of fuelling a process of catching up, because they have basically exhausted their innovation space. During paradigm transitions, however, there is a powerful opportunity to leap forward. The new generic technologies and organizational principles can be used to modernize and rejuvenate mature technologies (and even old traditional In this specific transition, a very strong third possibility appeared in the context of globalization. In contrast with how the industries of the mass production paradigm deployed nationally first, before moving internationally, many industries in this paradigm 21 Jang-Sup Shin (1992) 22 Nadvi (1999) have operated globally from phase one. This has opened the possibility of participating in global networks in many roles and with varied arrangements. 24 It has also allowed producing locally for global trading companies, as single firms or through cooperating clusters. Hobday (1995 ) Radosevic (1999 25 Schmitz and Knorringa (1999) Schmitz and Nadvi (1999) . See also IDS Collective Efficiency Research Project 26 Used in a similar sense by Mytelka (1994) is important to be informed and aware of the stage of evolution of the technologies and of the patterns of competition, to assess the interests and strengths of possible partners or competitors. This allows the evaluation of one's assets and possibilities, improves decision making and negotiating tactics. § However, the stage of deployment of the technological revolution also matters.
Degree of maturity and deployment
Time
Since technological revolutions make many successive systems co-evolve, during the early decades there tends to be a prevalence of new important technologies in phases one and two, whereas in later decades there is a predominance of technologies approaching maturity (phases three and four) until they overlap in the next transition. So individual windows of opportunity are strongly shaped by the wider context. This affects both entrepreneurial and national strategies. § Finally, the choice of dependent or "autonomous" entry is very much determined by one's own conditions. But it also demands a good understanding of the evolving power structures, in order to identify the present and future interests of the incumbents. The weaker the player the more important it is to learn to dance with the powerful "wolves" (and even to distinguish among wolves and how to attract them).
Of course, not all technologies are open to negotiation. It could also be that real success may demand confrontation and zero sum games. What should be avoided is negotiating mutual benefit arrangements as if they were confrontations. It is candid to believe that import substitution and export promotion policies "imposed" conditions and restrictions on transnational corporations or "forced" them to locate in developing countries. In both cases what was being negotiated in practice was a policy framework that would simultaneously solve the problems of both sides of the table. This means that properly identifying the interests and needs of the prospective partners avoids the risk of aiming at the wrong target and of wasting the value of one's assets in the negotiation.
Historically, processes of rapid growth and economic development, whether catching up from behind or forging ahead to the front ranks, have been successful processes of technological development. 27 These have usually been based on playing successive positive sum games with those ahead and being prepared for changing the game as the context and the structures evolve.
Past experience and the next window
Looking back at the recent history of the developing world and the various strategies applied, we can recognize how, consciously or intuitively, something akin to positive sum games was constructed between the interests of advanced country firms and those of developing countries. The analysis of this experience can help us look ahead with more informed criteria for the future. Nevertheless, as always happens with the lessons of history, it is crucial to distinguish recurrence from uniqueness. There are patterns of change that recur in each paradigm, yet each paradigm is basically unique and must be analyzed in its peculiar features.
c. Inventing and reinventing development strategies
In the 1950's the modern era of conscious ¨Third world¨ State involvement in the industrialization process began in earnest. It was a time when an increasing number of mass production industries were in their third phase, seeking extended markets, pursuing economies of scale, forming oligopolies and opening international outlets. Import Substituting Industrialization, subsidized and protected behind tariff barriers, became a positive sum game. The international companies multiplied their markets by exporting much greater quantities of "unassembled" parts to their affiliates abroad, which in addition had higher profits margins; the developing countries had a learning context for management and workers in -and especially around-these "screw-driver assembly" plants. The resulting demand for construction, roads, ports, transport, electricity, water and communications stimulated the modernization of the environment and fostered the growth of many complementary capabilities.
By the mid-sixties the model was confronting limits in some of the countries, at the same time as many products and industries in the advanced world were reaching phase four, approaching exhaustion of their technological and market dynamism. Transfer of technology and Export Promotion policies became the new mutually beneficial game. It began with transfer of mature technologies to national governments and local capital together with production for re-export from low cost labor locations. By the 1970's 27 Lall (1992) Bell and Pavitt (1993 ) Reinert (1994 ) Freeman (1994 ) Von Tunzelmann (1995 transnational corporations were engaged in "redeployment." A significant flow of exports to the advanced world was generated. There were "miracles" in Brazil and South Korea;
there were "export processing zones" in many countries. It seemed like a New International
Economic Order was emerging. The "North-South Dialogue" became the place where such hopes were negotiated.
By the early 1980s the scene changed again. The Microelectronics revolution had irrupted in the early seventies and many of its products were reaching phase two. The Japanese had rejuvenated the automobile industry and their new organizational paradigm was radically transforming its competitors in the U.S. and Europe. 28 "Stagflation" accompanied maturity in most of the old industries in the advanced world. Export markets began to shrink; the debt crisis set in. A new strategy had to be designed.
Most of Latin America failed to do so and lived through the aptly designated "lost decade."
The Four Tigers in Asia took the leap forward by capturing market after market in the rear end and at the edges of the fast growing revolutionary industries. They also rejuvenated mature technologies with modern practices and joined the networks of global firms as OEM suppliers of parts and components. The intense learning and the emphasis on human capital and on the active absorption of technology, which was behind these achievements, cannot be overstated. 29 It is in sharp contrast with the much more passive "transfer of technology" practices still common in most Latin American and African countries, as well as in the rest of Asia, in that period. The 1990s were marked by the structuring of the emerging industries and widespread modernization of the existing ones. As industry after industry reached phase two, the fierce competition for market positioning set in. The construction of global corporations and global markets, the battle to set the dominant design and other standards, the weaving of complex webs of collaboration on a worldwide scale, the strengthening of the market power of brands, the search for locational advantages, both dynamic and static, the interest in Each of the previous successive strategies has had advantages and disadvantages, benefits and harmful effects. Some countries have made big leaps, others small ones or none at all; some have kept the advances gained, others have lost them and fallen back. Some of the setbacks may be due to sticking to policies when they were no longer effective.
Admittedly, the overall results are discouraging. This can lead to disillusion or to recognizing the extreme difficulty involved in bridging the chasm and the need for a deeper understanding of the issues.
Confronting the next stage
The new century will sooner or later see the creation of conditions for the full deployment of the wealth creating potential of the Information Age.
30 Hobday M (1994) The 1990s were a decade of experimentation everywhere, inside and outside global firms, in countries, regions, cities and localities, in the economy, in governments and other institutions and in various levels of society. As a result, the "common sense" of the flexible systems paradigm has spread widely and is becoming the normal way of seeing and doing things.
The 21 st Century begins with the passage to the third phase in the deployment of the present paradigm, the Late Growth period. 31 In the same movement, many industries are reaching phase three of their trajectories, moving towards economies of scale and oligopolies to reduce excess competition. Agreements, mergers, acquisitions, industry shake-outs, takeovers and other arrangements are leading to the worldwide concentration of important industries in a few mega-firms or a few global alliances. 32 Further still, the growing power of intermediation, through control of access to clients, could be heading towards a modern version of the old "trading companies" based on the power of information and telecommunications. 33 These giant firms might become huge global umbrellas to encompass worldwide diversity, covering all segments from the luxury and speciality niches to the cheapest standard product or service, purchasing and selling across the planet and locating each activity wherever advantages are greater.
For the developing world the next stage may be a very complex period of accommodation to the new emerging power structures. For firms, localities, regions and countries, learning to play positive sum games with these giants may be the nature of the next window of opportunity. Attempting local or regional networks, perhaps independent, perhaps in 31 For a more complete analysis of the phases in the deployment of a paradigm and the role of finance capital in the process, see Perez (2002) . 32 Chesnais (1988) Bressand (1990) Chesnais (1992) Klepper and Kenneth (1994) Castells (1996) connection with global networks, could still be a possibility based on very specific local advantages. Of course, those countries and firms that have accumulated capabilities in technology, organization, marketing and negotiation, will be much better placed for locating themselves favorably under the "umbrellas" or audaciously outside them.
Cooperation between firms, regions or countries can strengthen the bargaining power of both strong and weak actors and agents.
We are suggesting then that the design of successful strategies requires assessing the conditions and accumulated capabilities of the country, region, firm or network in question, in order to take advantage of the next (not the previous) window of opportunity, while recognizing, adopting and adapting the potential and the features of the relevant paradigm.
The last section will review some of the implications of these features.
Approaching development under the present paradigm
Accelerated growth of firms, localities or countries depends on the availability of a rich technological potential and the appropriate form of organization to take advantage of it.
Whatever the point of departure, and whatever the goal to pursue, success in these times is likely to hinge on how deeply the logic of the new paradigm is absorbed and creatively adopted and adapted at all levels of society.
The centralized pyramids of mass production times effectively served firms and governments, universities and hospitals, private and public organizations of all sorts. For more than two decades now, modern firms -global or local-have been profoundly 33 Bressand and Kalypso eds. (1989) Kanellou (1999) restructuring and rapidly recognizing the advantages of networks and of learning organizations. 34 The time has come for governments to experiment in the same direction.
Here, we shall touch upon some aspects of the necessary transformation.
d. Technology at the core of development strategies
It is widely recognized that the Japanese surge ahead, to become the second largest economy in the world (and to remain there in spite of a prolonged crisis), involved exercises in technological foresight to collectively signal the path ahead and intense learning, training and innovating efforts. 35 The story of the Four Tigers advancing from behind is also one of widespread education and learning. 36 Furthermore, successful global firms have redesigned their structures and practices to favor continuous learning and improvement. Knowledge management 37 is becoming a key concern and not only do they organize regular training at all levels, but some have even set up their own "universities."
38
For a developing country to believe that significant advances are possible without equivalent efforts is an illusion. There is no shortcut to development without mastery of technology in the simple sense of social, technical and economic know-how incorporated in people. This was blurred by the peculiar conditions of import substitution policies which for a time made it possible for many countries to achieve impressive growth performance, investing in mature plant and equipment, without intensive learning efforts.
34 Nonaka (1994) Senge (1990 ) Lundvall (1997 See also Druid Project Web site. 35 Peck and Goto (1981) Irvine and Martin (1985) . 36 Ernst et al. (1998) 37 Nonaka (1995) Burton-Jones (1999 ) Lamoreaux et al.(1999 38 Wiggenhorn (1990) In this particular paradigm having capacity to handle information and knowledge for innovation is more central than ever. Perhaps the most relevant meaning of the expression "knowledge society" 39 is the creation of conditions for access and use of information by all members of society. Therefore, strengthening the individual and social learning capacities for wealth creation becomes an essential way of enhancing development potential.
Consequently technology must be at the core -not at the edge-of development policies. In practical terms this implies a different way of conceiving strategies and demands a complete rethinking of both the education and training systems and of science and technology policies.
Educational reform needs to upgrade and update the technical contents, and -perhaps mainly-perform a radical transformation in the methods, the goals and the tools to make them compatible and relevant for the future: 40 Allowing students to take responsibility for their own process; putting emphasis on "learning to learn" and "learning to change," on creative teamwork and learning to formulate problems and evaluate alternative solutions; finding ways of giving access to Internet and computers and providing conditions for acquiring the ability to ask questions and process information.
Those skills are becoming the basis for participating in the modern workplace, where firms face a constantly changing environment with continuous improvement practices. It is also the manner in which persons and groups can manage the growth of their own wealth creating capabilities, as employees or entrepreneurs, and of the necessary organizational 39 Castells (1996) Mansell and Wehn (1998) 40 Perez (1992 and 2000) ECLAC/ UNESCO (1992) abilities for improving their communities and organizations, as group members or as leaders.
The other crucial transformation regards the "Science and Technology System," which was created by most developing countries as a set of government organizations in charge of technological development. Experience showed that the use of these capabilities for actual innovation in production was very low. Given the mature technologies with which most industries worked, there was little capacity to absorb the results of these laboratory technologists. The ensuing frustration when trying to build the university-industry "bridge" led most research technologists to become adjuncts of the scientific community and to adopt their methods, time scales, values and attitudes.
In the new context it is necessary to move in two directions: a strong research investment for the future and a reconnection of technology with the direct and immediate improvement of the production networks and of the quality of life.
This move from a "supply-push" S&T system to an interactive network with producers has warranted the term "National System of Innovation (NSI)" 41 defined by Freeman as "the network of institutions in the public and private sectors whose activities and interactions initiate, import, modify and diffuse new technologies."
42
This supposes understanding the NSI as a social rather than a governmental construction. It includes the environment in which innovativeness is stimulated and supported; the quality of the links between suppliers, producers and users; the education and training system; 41 Freeman (1987) . Lundvall (1988) 42 Freeman (1995 Although the size and complexity of the task call for a strong State, the all-powerful "national state," as it developed after WWII, needs to be redefined and reinvented, probably along lines similar to those applied by the modern global corporations.
Nobody would hold that the central management of a giant corporation becomes weak when it decentralizes and gives high autonomy and decision making power to its product, plant or market managers across the world. Computers and telecommunications have made it possible to exercise strong leadership over a vast and growing structure made up of semiautonomous units, following strategic guidelines. Interactive information channels make it possible to monitor and control highly complex networks with strongly differentiated components.
43 Arocena (1997) 44 Reinert (1999) Wade (1990) Osborne and Gaebler (1993) The new shape of the needed strong "public sector" can imitate those networks. As in the past, once technology helps define the optimal shape of organizations, it can be applied effectively even without the technology. This in turn prepares the terrain for the incorporation of modern technology when required.
The central national State can exercise its leadership by inducing the convergent actions of the various social actors towards a commonly agreed general direction of change. It can play a crucial role as "intermediary" between the growing global or supra-regional instances and the increasingly autonomous regional, local and even parish or community levels.
There is also a process of "diffusion of power." 45 Networks of private interests, units of civil society, global firms, communications media, organized interest groups, "NGOs," etc.
are increasing the diversity of development agents and their interlinkages, nationally and globally. The capacity of the national State to serve as "broker" within the country and between the various supra-national and sub-national levels needs to be put into action for promoting and negotiating a fair game for all. Acting as consensus builder among the various players could lead to more effective authority, as the foundation of a real power to influence the course of events.
Think global, act local
The new seat of the proactive development state is, in our view, the local government. The old "central plan" idea of promoting a set of national industries to generate the wealth to fund social advance needs to be reconsidered. Obviously, in each country some important and competitive activities must develop, strongly connected to world markets and keeping up with the technological frontier, propelling growth and producing the necessary foreign exchange. But that is not enough. The time and the conditions have come to abandon the illusion of a "trickle down effect" and move towards the direct involvement of the whole population in wealth creating activities.
The characteristics of the present paradigm make it possible to envisage a more integrated model of development, where the large competitive firms that operate in global markets are complemented by the differentiated development of the whole territory. This is possible through taking advantage of the potential for variety in products and scales, the power to increase the quality and efficiency of all sectors and activities and, most of all, the accessibility to all human beings of achieving the know-how for constantly improving yourself, your work and your environment.
There are already many examples of local governments identifying the "vocation" of the community, promoting consensus, involving local and foreign firms, banks, the education systems and other actors to promote development projects. 46 There are also local networks of small and medium firms collaborating in business and technology to cover export markets together. 47 The study of interaction in these "clusters" has suggested the term "local systems of innovation" 48 though, in our view it would be more appropriate to call them "territorial networks of innovativeness."
45 Strange (1996) 46 Tendler (1997 ) Gabor A (1991 The Illinois Coalition (1999) 47 Nadvi and Schmitz (1999) . 48 Cassiolato and Lastres (1999) In the previous transition, between the two world wars, the homogenizing "social" character of the emerging paradigm of mass production was so strong that even nazism called itself National Socialism. Equally, the strong role of a centralized State was so crucial that government intervention in the economy along Keynesian lines, so fiercely opposed in the 1920s and 30s, was fully adopted after WWII even in the most liberal 
